Utah v. Webb : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Utah v. Webb : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christine Fitzgerald Soltis; attorney for appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general;attorneys for respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Webb, No. 890256 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1821
irt#irf<\*t \Mr 
LTAW 
be 
IA10 
be COURT OF THE STATE OF diJHNK 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PIaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLES WEBB, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 810.283 
Priori ty HID 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
• 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELj 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-3} 
(1978) , IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT' 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAJ?fcOF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES. S. SAWAYA, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
CHRISTINE FITZGERALD SOLTIS 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 Soijth, #330 
Salt Lake City^: Utah 84111 
I, 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLES WEBB, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880283 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION FOR 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-302 
(1978), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES. S. SAWAYA, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
CHRISTINE FITZGERALD SOLTIS 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
'HE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - AHORMYGNIRAI 
236 STATE CAPITOL • SA1T LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE 801 538 1015 • FAX NO 801 538 1121 
JOSEPH E TESCH 
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
October 10, 1988 
Mary Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Charles Webb, Case No. 890256-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 24(j) (1989), respondent 
cites State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988) as supplemental 
authorities for the court's consideration relevant to Point IV A. 
of respondent's brief in support of the above entitled case. 
Sincerely, 
DRL:bks 
cc: Samuel Alba 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: MR. WEBB WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO A 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AFFECTING HIS 
TRIAL ATTORNEY » S PERFORMANCE 8 
A. REQUIREMENT OF SEPARATE STATE 
ANALYSIS 8 
B. REQUIREMENTS OF A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST 11 
POINT II: THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION 
FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 23 
POINT III: THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE 
PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS AT TRIAL 
AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT WARRANTING 
A MISTRIAL 26 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING 
THE ARREST OF MR. WEBB 33 
A. THE SHOTGUN, WATCH AND RING WERE 
SEIZED PURSUANT TO AN UNLAWFUL 
ARREST AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
EXCLUDED AT TRIAL 33 
B. EVEN IF THE ARREST IS FOUND TO 
BE LAWFUL, THE SUBSEQUENT SEARCH 
OF THE PREMISES WAS NOT INCIDENT 
TO THE ARREST NOR WAS THERE 
VALID CONSENT 36 
POINT V: THE INCREASED PENALTY PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-203(1) (SUPP. 
1988) WERE IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO 
MR. WEBB'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY 42 
A. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION REQUIRE THE 
APPLICATION OF A SPECIFIC 
STATUTE OVER A GENERAL PROVISION... 42 
B. EVEN IF THE ENHANCEMENT 
PROVISIONS ARE FOUND APPLICABLE, 
THE TOTAL INCREASE ALLOWABLE IS 
LIMITED TO FIVE YEARS 47 
POINT VI: MR. WEBB WAS PREJUDICED BY AN 
INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS IN PART 
ARGUMENTATIVE AND AN IMPROPER 
COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE 47 
CONCLUSION 48 
APPENDIX 50 
- 1 1 -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Batchelor v. Smith, 555 P.2d 871 (Utah 1976) 14 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 
31 L.Ed. 2d 483 (1967) 18 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 
23 L.Ed. 2d 685 (1969) 40 
Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 400 A.2d 160 (Penn. 
1979) 18 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 
64 L.Ed. 2d 333 (1980) 12, 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 
100 L.Ed 891 (1956) 22 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 
55 L.Ed. 2d 426 (1978) 12, 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 
19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) 37 
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984) 35 
Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 1988) 37 
Owens v. State, 654 P.2d 657 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). 27, 
People v. Jones, 520 N.E. 2d 325 (111. 1988) 13 
People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d 1238 (1971). 34 
Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 88 S. Ct. 
1755, 20 L.Ed. 2d 828 (1968) 35 
Sanchez v. State, 756 S.W.2d 452 (Ark. 1988) 13 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 92 S. Ct. 
204 36 L.Ed. 2d 854 (1973) 37 
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 55 L.Ed. 2d 
70, 98 S. Ct. 909 (1978) 45, 
-iii-
State v. Anderson, 754 P.2d 542 (N.Mex. App. 1988)... 38 
State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986) 27, 32 
State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978) 43, 46 
State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987) 9, 11 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 9, 26 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) 21 
State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525 (N.J. 1982) 19 
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986) 10 
State v. Caraher, 293 Ore. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982).. 10 
State v. Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 738 P.2d 
239 (1987) 34, 36 
State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 195 (Utah App. 1987) 32 
State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558 (Utah 1987) 46 
State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981) 37, 39 
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983) 39, 41 
State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986) 37 
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) 11 
State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 1006 (Alaska App. 1986)... 34, 35 
State v. Julian, Case No. 870351 (Utah S. Ct., 
March 28, 1989) 9 
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987) 24 
State v. Kananen, 97 Ariz. 233, 399 P.2d 426 
(Enbanc 1965) 38 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) 9, 27 
State v. Laris, 2 P.2d 243 (Utah 1931) 24 
State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988) 9, 11 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) 36 
-iv-
State v. Minear, 47 Ore. App. 995, 615 P.2d 416 
(1980) 40, 
State v. Musgrave, 102 N.M. 148, 692 P.2d 534 
(N.Mex. App. 1984) 27 
State v. Nichols, 145 P.2d 802 (Otah 1944) 24 
State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986) 15 
State v. Pecona, 619 P.2d 173 (Mont. 1980) 48 
State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984) 31 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) 23 
State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P. 1023 (1911) 24 
State v. Rocha, 600 P.2d 543 (Utah 1979) 41 
State v. Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N.Mex. 1983) 18 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 43 
State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Utah 1980) 17, 
State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521 (Utah 1983) 27 
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988) 9, 
33, 
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986) 29 
State v. Thompson, 108 Ariz. 500, 502 P.2d 1319 
(1972) 13 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 27, 
State v. Tippets, 584 P.2d 892 (Utah 1978) 18 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) 27, 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 
(Utah 1973) 27, 
State v. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (1989) 9 
State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984) 46, 
-v-
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 25 L.Ed. 2d 763 (1984) 9 
Thurlow v. State, 81 Nev. 510, 406 P.2d 918 (1965)... 38 
United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 
1980) 12 
United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 
1976) 34 
United States v. Newman, 733 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 
1984) 13 
United States v. Petz, 764 F.2d 1390 (11th Cir. 
1985) 19 
Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965). 38 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTUIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, §12, Utah State Constitution 2, 
Article I, §14, Utah State Constitution 2, 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 2, 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution 2, 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1978) 48 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988) 2, 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1978) 43 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-201 et seq. (Supp. 1988) 43 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (Supp. 1988) 43 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 1978 2, 
44 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501 (Supp. 1988) 2, 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-6 (1982) 33 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-8 (1982) 34 
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 (Supp. 1988) 2, 
-vi-
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (2) (a) (Supp. 1988) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (i) (Supp. 1988) 1 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 29, 31 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 405 31 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 608 31 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(b) 2, 16, 17 
OTHER SOURCES 
American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal 
Justice 2d Ed., Vol. I, Defense Function, §4-3-5 
"Conflict of Interest'1 16, 17, 21 
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections 
of Individual Rights, 90 Harvard L.Rev. 489 (1977)... 10 
Carson, "Last Things Last:" A Methodological 
Approach to Legal Argument in State Courts, 
19 Willamette L.Rev. 641 (Fall, 1983) 10 
The New Federalism: Toward a Principled 
Interpretation of the State Constitution, 
29 Stan. L.Rev. 297 (1977) 11 
-vii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent/ 
CHARLES WEBB/ 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880283 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Webb appeals from his conviction of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony/ in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County/ State of Utah. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Was the defendant denied the effective 
assistance of counsel at trial due to a conflict of interest 
affecting his trial counsel? 
2. Was there insufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction for aggravated robbery? 
3. Did the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's 
improper remarks at trial amount to misconduct warranting a 
new trial? 
4. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress 
1 
evidence seized during the arrest of the defendant? 
5. Were the increased penalty provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988) improperly applied to the 
defendant? 
6. Was the defendant prejudiced by an instruction 
which was in part argumentative and an improper comment on the 
evidence? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable constitututional provisions, statutes 
and rules for a determination of this case are: 
1. Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
2. Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
3. Article I, §12, Utah Constitution. 
4. Article I, §14, Utah Constitution. 
5. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988). 
6. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1978). 
7. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501 (Supp. 1988). 
8. Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 (Supp. 1988). 
9. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7. 
which texts are set forth in the attached Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1978) and an enhancement of one to 
five years for use of a firearm pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988) in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about 3:30 p.m. on October 21, 1987, King's Custom 
Jewelers in Trolley Square, Salt Lake City, Utah was robbed of 
jewelry, diamonds and cash, valued at approximately $40,000 
dollars (T. 83-84, 174). In the store at the time was the 
owner, Karekine Karmelian and a Trolley Square security guard, 
Stephen Church, who had entered the store while the robbery 
was in progress (T. 82-83, 96, 101). Subsequently, both 
witnesses identified co-defendant John Humphrey as the lone 
robber (T. 85, 187-188) . 
The robbery lasted only minutes (T. 103, 138). 
During the robbery, Mr. Karmelian was busy removing cash and 
jewelry from the safe and display cases (T. 114-15, 125-130). 
At the robber's direction, Mr. Church was occupied with 
handcuffing himself to Mr. Karmelian (T. 200-02, 204). There 
was minimal conversation (T. 84-85, 90, 95, 102-103, 128-129). 
The witnesses varied in their physical description of the 
robber in regards to his height, weight and clothing (T. 
132-33, 136-37, 211-12, 214). 
The two witnesses also varied in their description of 
the robber's weapon. Mr. Karmelian described it as a big 
shotgun with a rusty colored barrel (T. 84, 88); Mr. Church as 
a twelve-gauge pump shotgun with a silver barrel (T. 188, 
191). Neither witness could identify Exhibit 1, the shotgun 
subsequently seized from Mr. Webb's home, as the gun used in 
the robbery (T. 155, 219). In fact, the shotgun seized from 
Mr. Webb did not have a rusty or silver colored barrel 
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(T. 148, 192). Additionally, Exhibit lfs handle is uniquely 
wrapped in black tape (T. 153); yet, neither witness noticed 
nor reported anything unusual about the handle of the shotgun 
used in the robbery (T. 153, 192). 
On November 3, 1987, Britt Martindale gave a 
statement to the police implicating Mr. Webb and Mr. Humphrey 
in the robbery (T. 330). On November 4, 1987, Mr. Webb and 
Mr. Humphrey were arrested at the home of Mr. Webb and his 
girlfriend, Renae Gregersen (T. 300, 330). 
Early in the morning of that day, police officers 
knocked on the Webb-Gregersen's door. As Ms. Gregersen 
unlocked the door, the police pushed it in and knocked her 
down (T. 687, 696). The officers had guns drawn, pointed at 
everyone including Ms. Gregersen's young son (T. 665, 672, 
696) . 
While Ms. Gregersen was kneeling on the floor, crying 
and very agitated (T. 659, 668, 688), she was arrested and 
asked to sign a search consent form (T. 301-02). Her only 
concern at the time was for her young infant, who was on a 
heart monitor since the infant's twin had died from Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome (T. 688, 696). The infant was crying 
all during this time (T. 673), and Ms. Gregersen has no memory 
of having signed any consent form (T. 697). 
After a three-hour search of the house, the only 
items recovered were the shotgun as previously described, a 
ring and a watch (T. 318-19; Exhibits 1, 2 & 3 respectively, 
R. 166). The ring was found inside a jewelry case in the 
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master bedroom (T. 304). The watch was found in Ms. 
Gregersen's purse (T. 318). No evidence of the robbery was 
found in a search of Mr. Webb's car (T. 342). 
On the day of the robbery, October 21, Mr. Webb, who 
had been traveling as part of his business, was in Ely, Nevada 
(T. 505-06) . He put a dated receipt in evidence from his stop 
in Ely (T. 506). He purchased the ring and watch from Britt 
Martindale on November 2, 1987, and gave the ring to Renae 
T. 510) . The shotgun he had bought and modified for Renae a 
long time ago (T. 514). 
Britt Martindale testified that on October 21, 1987, 
Mr. Webb and Ms. Gregersen drove up to her house around four 
o'clock p.m. (T. 255); Humphrey was hidden in the trunk of 
their car (T. 227-28)*. They brought in a canvas bag (T. 230) 
and a shotgun (T. 231) and began sorting through jewelry taken 
out of the bag (T. 232). Humphrey, who was living at the 
Martindale home at the time, went into the bathroom and shaved 
off his beard (T. 229) . The shotgun and bag were hidden in 
the Martindale home for several hours (T. 239) . According 
to Britt, that night Webb, Humphrey and her husband, Russell 
Martindale, left for Las Vegas (T. 241). 
Ms. Martindale never gave any explanation why this 
took place at her house. She admitted that at the time of the 
robbery she and her husband were estranged but had since 
reconciled (T. 248) . She knew that Russell had stolen the 
vehicle used as the get-away car for the robbery (T. 252). At 
trial, it was established that Russell Martindale had been 
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granted immunity for the theft of the vehicle (T. 249). No 
search was ever made of the Martindale home (T. 340-41) . 
Prior to trial, Mr. Webb filed a Motion to Suppress 
the evidence seized from his home at the time of his arrest 
(R. 65-66; argued T. 645-708). The motion was denied 
(R. 68-69). He then filed a Supplemental Motion to Suppress 
Evidence (R. 102; argued Supp. T. 7-38) which was denied 
R. 119). The motion was raised and denied again at the start 
of trial (T. 60-61). 
Additionally, Mr. Webb moved to sever his trial from 
Ms. Gregersen's and Mr. Humphrey's trial (R. 82). This was 
granted as to Ms. Gregersen (R. 68-69). In Mr. Webb's 
post-trial Motion for a New Trial (R. 285-286) , he again 
raised the severance issue as well as the conflict of interest 
created by two public defenders serving as counsel for himself 
and Humphrey at their joint trial (R. 287-288) . The motions 
were denied (T. 743). 
At the end of the State's case, Mr. Webb moved for a 
directed verdict of acquittal based on the insufficency of 
the evidence (T. 425). This motion was renewed prior to jury 
deliberation (T. 622) and in Mr. Webb's Motion for a New Trial 
(T. 741-42; R. 285). All of the above motions were denied 
(T. 425, 622, 742-43) . 
Prior to trial, Mr. Webb moved in limine to exclude 
all evidence of any claimed prior bad acts of his (R. 105-06; 
Supp. T. 3-7) . The motion was granted (Supp. T. 6-7) . The 
admonition against such evidence was restated at the start of 
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trial (T. 61-62). Despite this, during the trial, the 
prosecutor made or elicited references concerning a previous 
police stop of Mr. Webb (T. 488-89, 523, 617; objections T. 
488, 523, 746), evidence of other crimes (T. 304-05; objection 
T. 305; argued T. 323-24), and Mr. Webb's alias (T. 327; 
objection T. 327; argued T. 428-429) . Other specific 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct will be discussed infra 
as appropriate to the argument. 
Prior to the giving of instructions, Mr. Webb 
objected to the language of Instruction No. 16 (T. 624-25, 
misidentified there as No. 17) . 
On June 22, 1988, after a jury trial, Mr. Webb and 
co-defendant Humphrey were found guilty of aggravated robbery, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §77-6-302 (1978). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Webb was denied his right to the effective 
assistance of counsel because his appointed counsel, the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association, improperly represented both 
Mr. Webb and his co-defendant Humphrey at their joint trial. 
This conflict of interest warrants a reversal of Mr. Webb's 
conviction. 
The prosecutor continually and intentionally violated 
a pre-trial order limiting inquiry into other alleged bad acts 
of Mr. Webb and otherwise solicited improper remarks. The 
cumulative effect of the prosecutor's conduct created 
prejudice to Mr. Webb justifying reversal in light of the 
general insufficiency of the evidence against Mr. Webb. 
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Evidence seized during the arrest of the defendants 
should have been suppressed since it was not seized pursuant 
to a search warrant, nor incident to arrest nor pursuant to 
any consent. In light of the insufficiency of the evidence, 
the improper introduction into evidence of the items so seized 
prejudiced Mr. Webb and warrant a reversal of his conviction. 
The imposition of an enhanced penalty based on the 
use of a firearm was improper due to the structure of the 
aggravated robbery statute. Even if permissibly imposed, the 
maximum enhanced penalty is limited to an additional five 
years. The case should be remanded for resentencing. 
The language of Instruction No. 17 prejudiced 
Mr. Webb by improperly presenting argument and comment on the 
evidence. In light of the insufficiency of the evidence, 
Mr. Webb's conviction should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. WEBB WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO A 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AFFECTING 
HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY'S PERFORMANCE. 
A. Requirement of Separate State Analysis. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part, that: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel . . . . In no 
instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. 
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The state provision clearly differs in language from the Sixth 
Amendment of the federal constitution which guarantees an 
accused in a criminal prosecution the "assistance of counsel 
for his defense." 
The federal provision has been universally 
interpreted as requiring the reasonably effective assistance 
of counsel. Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 25 L.Ed 2d 763 (1984). Utah has adopted the same 
standard in applying the federal provision. State v. Lovell 
758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). Under either federal or state 
case law, a defendant who claims that his rights to the 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment were violated 
must show that his trial counsel "rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner ... and that [his] 
counsel's performance prejudiced" him. State v. Julian, Case 
No. 870351 (Utah S. Ct., March 28, 1989); State v. Speer, 750 
P.2d 186 (Utah 1988) and State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 
(Utah 1987) . A defendant is prejudiced when "a reasonable 
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the 
result would have been different." State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 
909, 913; Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 694. Any 
modification of the federal interpretation of the federal 
constitutional standard has been expressly rejected by the Utah 
Court. State v. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 41 n. 2 (1989). 
However, despite repeated requests for separate analysis 
of the state constitutional provision, State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) and State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 
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1987) , no Utah decision has ever considered the parameters of 
the state guarantee. This omission has created state case law 
which simply "marchts] lock-step with interpretation given to 
. . . the United States Constitution." State v. Bishopr 717 
P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 1986) (J. Durham, concurring opinion). 
But: 
The legal revolution which has brought 
federal law to the fore must not be allowed 
to inhibit the independent protective force 
of state law - for without itf the full 
realization of our liberties cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Wm. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of 
Individual Rights, 90 Harvard L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977). 
Unfortunately, because the Utah courts until 1986 
failed to even note the need for any separate analytic 
comparisons of state and federal constitutional provisions, 
earlier case law is of little value. To compound the void of 
precedent, there is virtually no legislative history 
discussing the intent of the Utah founders in not adopting the 
federal language. Yet, the failure of prior Utah cases to 
fully articulate the parameters of state constitutional 
protection cannot excuse passivity now. For even where the 
state and federal prohibitions are textually identical, state 
court decisions interpreting the state provision remain state 
law despite subsequent federal doctrinal changes. State v. 
Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982); Carson, "Last 
Things Last": A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in 
State Courts, 19 Willamette L. Rev. 641 (Fall, 1983). 
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This Court is then faced with a "clean slate" in 
analyzing Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution. While the state may claim that this Court 
should not generally construe the Utah constitutional 
provision more narrowly, such an argument fails to recognize 
that: 
Because United States Supreme Court 
decisions ... mark the minimum guarantees 
of individual rights, state courts that 
give truly independent force to their own 
constitutions generally reach results more 
protective of those rights than the Supreme 
Court. 
The New Federalism; Toward a Principled Interpretation of the 
State Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297, at 297 (1977). The 
federal decisions may persuade, but they cannot compel, the 
acceptance of the federal minimum guarantee as the statefs 
maximum defense of individual rights. State v. Jewett, 500 
A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) . 
The application of this analysis will be discussed 
below. 
B. Requirements of a Conflict of Interest. 
As discussed, before the alleged deficiencies of a 
counsel's performance will be considered by an appellate 
court, the defendant must establish that he "suffered unfair 
prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiencies." State v. 
Lovell, 758 P.2d 909; State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
1987). Absent actual prejudice, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel will not warrant reversal of a 
conviction. Id. 
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But, an entirely different approach is taken where 
the claim of ineffectiveness is, as here, based on a conflict 
of interest in the representation of the defendant. 
tl]f a criminal defendant is represented at 
trial by an attorney, either appointed or 
retained, who labors under an actual, and 
not merely a potential conflict of 
interest, the defendant has been denied 
effective assistance of counsel as a matter 
of law; and, unless he has knowingly and 
intelligently waived his sixth amendment 
right to confict-free representation, 
reversal is automatic. No prejudice need 
be shown. (Citations omitted). 
United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 1980) 
relying on Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 
55 L.Ed 2d 426 (1978) . 
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the convictions when it 
concluded that the trial court had improperly required a 
public defender to jointly represent three defendants despite 
timely objections that such representation created a conflict 
of interest. Where the potential of a conflict had been 
raised at trial, the Court held that prejudice would be 
presumed. 435 U.S. at 490. 
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court 
refined its standard. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 
100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed 2d 333 (1980), unlike Holloway, the 
defendant first claimed that his lawyers represented 
conflicting interests in a post-conviction habeas corpus 
action. Noting that under the facts, the defendant had not 
established that an actual conflict of interest existed but 
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merely had demonstrated the possibility of conflict/ the Court 
held that reversal was not mandated. 466 U.S. at 350. 
From thisf two rules evolve. Where a potential 
conflict is brought to the attention of the trial court prior 
to or during trial and the trial court fails to actf the mere 
fact of a potential or possible conflict will warrant reversal 
without any further showing of prejudice. Where/ however/ the 
conflict is not brought to the attention of the trial court 
but only raised on appeal/ the defendant "must demonstrate the 
existence of an actual conflict of interest." People v. 
Jones/ 520 N.E.2d 325/ 328 (111. 1988); United States v. 
Newman/ 733 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1984). 
Stated another wayr it is now recognized: 
. • . that prejudice would be irrelevant if 
it could be shown that [the attorney's] 
conflict of interest had any actual effect 
whatever on his representation of [the 
defendant]. 
Sanchez v. State/ 756 S.W.2d 452/ 454 (Ark. 1988). It is only: 
. . . necessary that a conflict of interest 
must have actually existed or have been 
inherent in the facts of the case from 
which the possibility of prejudice flowed. 
State v. Thompson/ 108 Ariz. 500/ 502 P.2d 1319/ 1323 (1972). 
Turning to the facts at bar/ Mr. Webb was arrested on 
November 4f 1987 and a legal defender was appointed to 
represent him (R. 9). A preliminary hearing was held for 
Defendants Webb and Humphrey on November 24 and 25; both were 
represented by members of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
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Association. (R. 16-18). On December 11, 1987, at the time 
of the district court arraignment, the L.D.A. withdrew from 
representing Mr. Webb and Mr. Webb privately retained Mr. Ray 
Stoddard to represent him (R. 21). Subsequently, Webb and 
Humphrey's trial was severed from that of Mr. Webb's 
girlfriend, Renee Gregerson (R. 68-69). On March 10, 1988, 
Mr. Stoddard filed a Motion to Sever Defendant Webb from 
Humphrey but moved to withdraw as counsel at the same time 
(R. 81-82). On March 22, 1988, the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association was again appointed to represent Mr. Webb. 
(R. 88). This appointed representation continued through 
trial. No ruling was ever made on the motion to sever Mr. 
Webb from Co-defendant Humphrey. No minute entry shows the 
withdrawal of the motion. Co-defendant Humphrey raised the 
issue pro se (R. 98). Mr. Webb re-raised the severance issue 
in his Motion for New Trial (R. 287-88). 
Entwined with Mr. Webb's repeated requests for 
severance from Humphrey, is his claim that there was both an 
inherent and actual conflict of interest in the Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders Association jointly representing himself and 
Humphrey under the facts and circumstances of his case (R. 
287-88) . 
To be clear, it is not Defendant Webb's position that 
the joint representation by associated attorneys is per 
se prohibited. Batchelor v. Smith, 555 P.2d 871 (Utah 1976). 
Nor, is it his position that he was entitled to severance as 
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a matter of right. State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 
1986) and cases cited therein. Rather, where the evidence was 
strong against Co-defendant Humphrey as the actual robber and 
only suspect or weak against Mr. Webb as an accomplice, the 
joint representation by L.D.A. in a joint trial precluded Mr. 
Webb's trial attorney from affirmatively arguing that Humphrey 
was indeed guilty and that Mr. Webb was being drawn in through 
mere association. As stated in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 
at 490-491, 
In a case of joint representation of 
conflicting interest the evil . . . is in 
what the advocate finds himself compelled 
to refrain from doing, not only at trial 
but also as to possible pretrial plea 
negotiations and in the sentencing process. 
It may be possible in some cases to 
identify from the record the prejudice 
resulting from an attorney's failure to 
undertake certain sentencing trial tasks, 
but even with a record of the sentencing 
hearing available it would be difficult to 
judge intelligently the impact of a 
conflict on the attorney's representation 
of a client. And to assess the impact of a 
conflict of interest in the attorney's 
options, tactics and decisions in plea 
negotiations would be virtually impossible. 
Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless 
error here would require, unlike most 
cases, unguided speculation. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The issue is whether a potential conflict existed such that 
trial counsel would have been affected in her representation 
of Defendant Webb. 
In determining whether a conflict existed, one first 
must look to ethical considerations. The American Bar 
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Association Standards for Criminal Justice state: 
Standard 4-3.5(b): Except for preliminary 
matters such as initial hearings or 
applications for bail, a lawyer or lawyers 
who are associated in practice should not 
undertake to defend more than one defendant 
in the same criminal case if the duty to one 
of the defendants may conflict with the duty 
to another. The potential for conflict of 
interest in representing multiple defendants 
is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should 
decline to act for more than one of several 
co-defendants except in unusual situations 
when, after careful investigation, it is 
clear that: 
(i) no conflict is likely to develop; 
(ii) the several defendants give an 
informed consent to such multiple 
representation; and 
(iii) the consent of the defendants is 
made a matter of judicial record. In 
determining the presence of consent by the 
defendants, the trial judge should make 
appropriate inquiries respecting actual or 
potential conflicts of interest of counsel 
and whether the defendants fully comprehend 
the difficulties that an attorney sometimes 
encounters in defending multiple clients. 
American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, 2d 
Ed. Vol. I, Defense Function, §4-3.5 "Conflict of Interest." 
Similarly, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
Utah Supreme Court require, in pertinent part: 
Rule 1.7(b) A lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person or by the lawyer's own 
interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely 
affected; and 
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(2) Each client consents after 
consultation. When representation of 
multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include 
explanation to each client of the 
implications of the common representation 
and the advantages and risks involved. 
Both in the Comments to the Utah rule and the Commentary to 
the A.B.A. standard, the writers recognized that the 
"potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple 
defendants in a criminal case is so grave" that normally joint 
representation by the same lawyer or law firm should not 
occur. A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice, 2d Ed. Vol. I, 
Defense Function, §4-3.5, Commentary at 4-41; Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 
1.7, Comments at 185 (Conflicts in Litigation). Moreover, the 
obligation of the attorney to explore and explain the 
situation is particularly strong in criminal cases because a 
criminal defendant is often either willing or coerced into 
accepting any representation. A.B.A. Standards, Id. 
Utah law has even codified the minimum standards 
governing appointed counsel, requiring among others the 
"undivided loyalty" of appointed counsel in representing an 
indigent defendant. Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1(4) (Supp. 1988). 
While Utah courts have never held that joint 
representation by a legal defender organization of 
co-defendants in a criminal trial is per se prohibited, this 
Court has concluded that such representation is suspect and 
should be examined. State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Utah 1980). 
In Smith, one legal defender represented two defendants at the 
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preliminary hearing stage. When one defendant subsequently 
plead guilty, a different public defender represented the 
remaining defendant at trial. No objection was made at trial 
but only raised on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court determined 
that a conflict did exist in the representation but found no 
actual prejudice. Despite this lack of prejudice, reversal 
was warranted because: 
...the assistance of counsel is among those 
"constitutional rights so basic to a fair 
trial that their infraction can never be 
treated as harmless error." 
621 P.2d at 699, quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
23, 87 S. Ct. 824, 31 L.Ed 2d 483 (1967) .1 
Other courts have taken a similar approach to State 
v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697. In Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 400 
A.2d 160 (Penn. 1979), the conviction was overturned where 
separate public defenders represented two brothers with 
adverse interests even though not co-defendants. In State v* 
Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N. Mex. 1983) , the court concluded 
factually that no actual conflict existed where a public 
defender had briefly represented a potential co-defendant 
turned witness because independent counsel had been appointed 
x
 Now Chief Justice Hall dissented in State v. Smith based on 
the defendant's failure to object at trial and the facts of 
the case, 621 P.2d at 700-701. Such a position is still 
consistent with the rule stated on page 13 of this brief; 
either an actual conflict must exist or the conflict must be 
inherent from the facts such that a "possibility of prejudice 
flows." Neither case requires proof of actual prejudice. See 
also State v. Tippetts, 584 P.2d 892 (Utah 1978), where the 
trial court did inquire about a potential conflict but the 
defendant affirmatively waived any objection. 
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to represent the the defendant. Relying on State v. Smith/ 
supra, the New Mexico court cautioned public attorneys to 
avoid even the appearance of impropriety. 
Still others have demanded that any time that there 
is multiple representation by public defenders or any law 
association/ there must be an inquiry and appraisal made as to 
any potential conflicts. State v. Bell/ 447 A.2d 525 (N.J. 
1982). This inquiry has often been in a Rule 11 format/ i.e./ 
a narrative discussion with the defendant and counsel 
concerning any potential conflicts and if appropriate a 
knowing an voluntary waiver of those rights. United States v. 
Petzr 764 F.2d 1390/ 1392 (11th Cir. 1985). These courts have 
recognized that in the assignment of attorneys for 
co-defendants assignment to outside independent counsel should 
be the norm, and not the exception. 
In the case at barf a potential conflict existed by 
the mere fact of the legal defenders jointly representing 
co-defendants - not a per se conflict/ but a potential. No 
inquiry was made. The conflict was further brought to focus 
when Mr. Webb sought severance from Humphrey in order to 
Interestingly, even a decade agof seventy percent (70%) of 
all public defender offices surveyed cautioned against 
multiple representations and forty-nine percent (49%) refused 
such representation. 447 A.2d at 530 n.8, citing Lowenthal/ 
Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 
64 Va. L.Rev. 939/ 950 n.40 (1978). 
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fully pursue his defense (R.81-82). Still no hearing was 
held. Even when Mr. Webb expressly raised the conflict 
issue (R.287-288), the trial court refused to adequately 
address the issue (T. 743). 
Clearly, the facts of the case raised actual conflict 
questions. In brief/ independent counsel would have bolstered 
the identification of the eyewitnesses that Humphrey committed 
the crime. Independent counsel would have attacked the 
credibility of Humphrey. Emphasis would have been placed on 
the facts that at the time of the robbery Humphrey was living 
with the Martindales, that Humphrey and Russ Martindale 
traveled together the night of the robbery and that Humphrey 
lived at the Martindales after the robbery. Independent 
counsel would have brought out that Britt Martindale needed a 
"patsy" to protect her husband and used Webb because he knew 
Humphrey. Knowing that Webb would buy jewelry, Britt 
Martindale sold Webb a few pieces from the robbery and then 
immediately called the police knowing they would find Webb 
with the evidence. Independent counsel would have pointed out 
that even if the jury believed that the gun found in Webb's 
home was the gun used in the robbery that Humphrey had access 
to the gun as it was merely left under the bed for Renee 
Gregerson's protection. 
Independent counsel would have actively sought a 
severance from Humphrey and would have distanced Webb from 
Humphrey in all aspects - as opposed to joint motions and 
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joint voir dire (R.159-164). Just how confusing this lumping 
together can be became apparent when the trial judge insisted 
that all defense witnesses were joint witnesses for purposes 
of examination (T.360). Independent counsel would have sought 
a lesser included instruction on possession of stolen 
property. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). 
Instead, what was presented to the jury was a united 
front where both defendants would succeed or fail together. 
Unfortunately, such was not in the best interest of 
Mr. Webb nor done with his agreement as evidenced by his 
post-trial Motion for a New Trial (R.287-288). What occurred 
was a "diminution in [the] zeal of representation" of Mr. 
Webb caused by the joint representation of co-defendants by 
the same law association. A.B.A. Standards for Criminal 
Justice, 2d Ed. Vol. I, Defense Function §4-3.5, Commentary. 
This lack of undivided loyalty, though not intentional on the 
part of trial counsel, denied Mr. Webb the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Therefore, this Court must decide if Utah's right to 
counsel grants to an accused any rights beyond those minimally 
guaranteed under federal law. Specifically, if the Utah 
constitutuion guarantees that no money or fees need be 
advanced to secure the right of representations, it becomes 
incumbent on this Court to require appointed counsel to act 
without conflicts in the same manner as required of private 
counsel. If a single attorney or a private law firm could not 
ethically or constitutionally represent both Mr. Webb and his 
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Co-defendant Humphrey then no lesser standard can be imposed 
where counsel is appointed. Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1(4) (Supp. 
1988) . 
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age-old 
problem. . . . In this tradition, our own 
constitutional guarantees of due process 
and equal protection both call for 
procedures in criminal trials which allow 
no insidious discriminations between 
persons and different groups of persons. 
Both equal protection and due process 
emphasize the central aim of our entire 
judicial system - all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 
"stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court." 
(Citations omitted). 
Griffm v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, at 16-17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 
L.Ed 2d 891 (1956). While it is true that convenience and 
economic considerations may encourage a "wink and nod" from 
the trial courts in allowing legal defender associations to 
routinely represent co-defendants, justice dictates a more 
circumspect approach. 
Inquiry at the trial level should be mandated in all 
cases of multiple representations of co-defendants by the same 
law association. While heavy reliance should be placed on 
counsel's evaluation of whether or not a conflict exists, the 
trial court must also inquire of the defendant as to his 
understanding of his right to conflict-free representation in 
the context of the circumstances of the case. 
If a potential conflict appears, remedial measures 
should be required. These could include severance, 
appointment of independent counsel and/or an on-the-record 
waiver of the conflict by defendant in a Rule 11 format. Most 
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importantly, attorneys must be encouraged to review their 
representation for conflicts early on in the case. Any doubts 
must be resolved in favor of the defendant. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY. 
The standard employed when reviewing the sufficiency 
of evidence and reversing a jury verdict is well-established. 
The appellate court must: 
. . . review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. (Citations omitted). 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). However, 
. . . this Court still has the right to 
review the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict. The fabric of 
evidence against the defendant must cover 
the gap between the presumption of 
innocence and the proof of guilt . . . 
[T]he reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentary fabric as far as it will go. 
But this does not mean that the court can 
take a speculative leap across a remaining 
gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
Id. at 444-45. 
Such impermissible speculative leaps have been 
identified by this Court in a number of cases. When 
accomplice and witness testimony is insufficient in that it 
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"castts] a mere suspicion on the defendant/1 a conviction 
cannot be sustained on the mere possession of stolen property. 
State v. Laris, 2 P.2d 243, 248-49 (Utah 1931). If the 
evidence tends to show a person other than the defendant stole 
the property now in the possession of the defendant, the 
evidence is insufficient. State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 
P. 1023, 1029 (1911). Mere possession of a gun used in a 
burglary without more is insufficient. State v. Nichols, 145 
P.2d 802, 806 (Utah 1944) . 
The evidence adduced at Mr. Webb's trial is 
insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery, 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1978). Neither the store owner nor 
the security guard identified Mr. Webb as the armed robber 
(T. 85, 187-188). None of Mr. Webb's fingerprints were found 
in the alleged get-away vehicle found near Trolley Square 
(T. 368-69, 379), a vehicle which Russell Martindale stole 
(T. 262, 344, 394). The only evidence against Mr. Webb 
consisted of the testimony of Britt Martindale and the gun, 
ring and watch seized from Mr. Webb's apartment some two weeks 
after the robbery. Without Britt Martindale's testimony, 
there was no evidence to support a robbery conviction against 
Mr. Webb, at best, it could be argued that he had possession 
of stolen property. State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987). 
What the evidence did establish is that Mr. Humphrey 
robbed the jewelry store (T. 85, 187-188). Further, the 
evidence established that the person who stole the get-away 
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vehicle was Russell Martindale (T. 262, 344f 394), that 
Humphrey was living at the Martindales at the time of the 
robbery (T. 277, 343), that immediately after the robbery, 
Humphrey shaved off his beard at the Martindale's home (T.229) 
and that same night left for Las Vegas, Nevada with Russell 
Martindale (T. 241). Subsequently, Humphrey returned to stay 
at the Martindalefs (T. 293-294, 434). 
In this context comes Britt Martindale, wife of 
Russell Martindale (T. 222). The Martindales had been 
separatee1 prior to the robbery, (T. 248) despite this, Russell 
Martindale as well as Humphrey were at the Martindale home the 
night of the robbery (T. 241). By her own admission, the 
jewelry stolen as well as the shotgun used were left at her 
house immediately after the robbery (T. 239). She did not deny 
that she knew the items were from a robbery. She also knew 
her husband had stolen a car (T. 252). Wanting to help her 
husband, she testified that she called the police about two 
weeks after the robbery (T. 330). As a result, her husband was 
not charged with any crimes in Ctah (T. 572) and the 
Martindales reconciled (T. 248). However, at the time of her 
testimony at Mr. Webb's preliminary hearing, Russell 
Martindale had been given no immunity (R. 18; T. 288-289, 383). 
In fact, only one week before Mr. Webb's trial, and only 
because the defense had subpoenaed him to testify, was Russell 
Martindale granted immunity (T. 249, 384, 573). The immunity 
was not in regard to the robbery charges but only for stealing 
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the vehicle in question (T. 572-573). Thus, Britt 
Martindalefs testimony that it was Mr. Webb and not her 
husband who aided and abetted Defendant Humphrey must be 
viewed as suspect and not compelling. 
The evidence must be viewed with the defense evidence 
that Mr. Webb was out of state on the day of the robbery 
T. 508) , had purchased the jewelry items from Britt (T. 510) , 
and merely owned a gun somewhat similar but significantly 
dissimilar to the one described by the eyewitnesses (T. 155, 
219). The evidence as a whole suggests that it was the 
Martindales who were accomplices to the robbery, and not Mr. 
Webb. Given the suspect accomplice and witness testimcny, the 
reasonable hypothesis that others committed the crime and the 
lack of direct evidence of Mr. Webb's participation or 
encouragement of the crime, Mr. Webb's conviction should be 
reversed. 
POINT III 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE 
PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS AT TRIAL 
AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT WARRANTING 
A MISTRIAL. 
This Court has consistently stated that in reviewing 
improper statements of counsel: 
. . . the test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, 
and were they, under the circumstances of 
the particular case, probably influenced by 
those remarks. 
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State v, Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), quoting State v. 
Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973). In accord, 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) and State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988). Step one is generally 
satisfied when the reirarks call "the jury!s attention to 
matters suggesting that something other than the question of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence is before the jurors." 
State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986). 
Step two is more difficult and involves a 
consideration of the circumstances of the 
case as a whole. In making such a 
consideration, it is appropriate to look 
at the evidence of defendant's guilt . . . 
[Iln a case with less compelling proof, 
this Court will more closely scrutinize 
the conduct. 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486. 
Such remarks, even though harmless when taken 
separately, may necessitate a new trial based on their 
cumulative effect. Owens v. State, 654 P.2d 657, 659 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1982) . Even one remark in violation of a court 
order limiting a certain line of inquiry can be grounds for 
reversal, if not "cut short . . . before any prejudice 
occur[s]." State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 525 (Utah 1983). 
More so, deliberate and repeated violations of court orders 
and instructions to the prosecution "may [more strongly] 
constitute misconduct requiring a new trial." State v. 
Musgrave, 102 N.M. 148, 692 P.2d 534, 536 (N.M. App. 1984). 
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In the case at bar, the prosecutor repeatedly and 
flagrantly disregarded the trial courts pretrial order 
prohibiting any references to other bad acts of Defendant Webb 
(R. 105-06, T. 61-62) in the following areas: 
1. OREGON POLICE STOP 
On October 29, 1987, a second-hand store called "Mike 
The Traders" in Portland, Oregon was under surveillance by a 
police stake-out. Messrs. Webb and Humphrey were observed 
talking to Mike Vaden the owner of the store. Messrs. Webb 
and Humphrey left but were stopped a short distance away for a 
minor traffic violation. The stake-out and stop were in no 
way connected to the investigation of the Salt Lake City 
robbery. 
In this context, the prosecutor extensively cross-
examined Mr. Humphrey about the stop over objection by Mr. 
Webbfs trial counsel (T. 488-490; objection T. 488-489). 
He continued the same tactic in cross-examining Mr. Webb 
to the point of even directly asking: 
PROSECUTOR COPE: THOSE THINGS THAT YOU 
SOLD WERE STOLEN, WERENfT THEY? 
DEFENDANT WEBB: NOT THAT I KNOW OF, SIR, 
AND ANYTHING THAT WAS SOLD UP THERE WAS NOT 
OUT OF A ROBBERY HERE EITHER, SIR. 
These facts are uncontested and are derived from the 
investigative reports of the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office supplied to trial counsel through discovery, including 
statements given the police by Russell Martindale on November 
11 and 13, 1987. They were some of the facts specifically 
referred in Defendant's Motion in Limine (T. 4-7). 
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Q. DO YOU REMEMBER WHO YOU SOLD IT TO? 
A. YES, I DO. 
Q. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH WHAT THAT PERSON 
TOLD THE POLICE REGARDING THE CONVERSATION 
HE HAD WITH YOU WHEN YOU SOLD THE THINGS? 
MS. WELLS: OBJECTION. 
(T. 523). The prosecutor reemphasized these improper facts 
during his closing (T. 617). None of this information was 
permissible. Both defendants had admitted to being in 
Portland together on the date in question (T. 48, 522-523). 
Indeed from the night of the robbery, October 21st, to the 
date of their arrest, November 4th, there was no dispute — 
nor particular relevance — to the whereabouts of Mr. Webb or 
Co-defendant Humphrey. Neither defendant "opened the door" to 
the testimony. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988). 
Neither defendant had put his character into dispute, Utah 
Rules of Evidence Rule 404(a), State v. Tarafa 720 P.2d 1368 
(Utah 1986); nor, was the evidence relevant to prove motive or 
intent, Rule 404(b), State v. Speer, supra. It was solely 
elicited for the improper purpose of persuading the jury that 
Mr. Webb had been involved in other bad acts. As such, it 
should have been specifically excluded. 
2. OTHER CRIMES 
Similiarily, the prosecutor continually attempted to 
paint Mr. Webb as generally a criminal. The prosecutor 
elicited from Detective Lomax that rings found in Mr. Webb's 
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home could be connected to uncharged crimes (T. 304-305; 
objection T. 305). Just prior to Detective Lomax!s testimony, 
the prosecutor elicited from Britt Martindale that other 
robberies were contemplated by the defendants at other 
locations (T. 291; objection T. 291-292) and that she did not 
believe that Mr. Webb was a legitimate jewelry trader because 
he sold expensive pieces cheaply (T. 292; hearing on objection 
T. 323). A motion for mistrial based on the cumulative 
prejudical effect of the above witnesses1 comments was made 
but denied (T. 323-324) . 
Additionally, the prosecutor elicited testimony that 
Mr. Webb used an alias (T. 327; objection T. 327; argued 
T. 428-29). During his cross-examination of Mr. Humphrey, the 
prosecutor intentionally elicited an answer which he knew 
would be that both defendants were in jail (T. 491; objection 
T. 540) . 
In two outrageous instances, the prosecutor's 
determination to portray Mr. Webb as a bad person and a 
criminal become clear. Ronda Blanchard, a defense witness 
called to testify as to Britt Martindale1s reputation for 
vericity, was asked on cross-examination: 
PROSECUTOR COPE: ISN'T IT TRUE THAT SHE 
[BRITT MARTINDALE] TOLD YOU THAT MR. 
HUMPHREY AND MR. WEBB WERE BAD PEOPLE AND 
THAT THEY WERE STEALING THINGS? 
(T. 502; objection sustained T. 502, see also T. 500-501). 
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Similiarily, the prosecutor recalled Detective Ray Dallmg on 
rebuttal (T. 547) to ask if the detective had questioned 
Mr. Webb and if the detective had attempted to verify that 
information (T. 552; objection T. 552-552) • The prosecutor 
stated, in front of the jury, in opposing the objection, 
PROSECUTOR COPE: YOUR HONOR, THE 
DEFENDANTS TOOK THE STAND AND BECAME 
WITNESSES BY SO DOING, I BELIEVE WE ARE 
ALLOWED, AT THIS POINT, TO INDICATE, BY 
OPINION OR REPUTATION, THAT THE 
TRUTHFULNESS AND VERACITY IS POOR OR BAD. 
THAT'S ALL I AM TRYING TO DO. 
Again, none of these references were admissible under 
the Utah Rules of Evidence Rules 404, 405 and 608, State v. 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, nor by the pretrial court order 
(R. 105-106, T. 61-62). The effect, in light of the totality 
the evidence, cannot be considered harmless where the evidence 
against Mr. Webb was not compelling but suspect. State v. 
Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984) . Less flagrant and less 
emulative prosecutorial misconduct has required reversal. 
Where the prosecutor elicited comments that the defendant had 
an alias, had been a protected federal witness and involved in 
"other criminal matters" the effect was prejudicial, State v. 
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486. Where the prosecutor in closing argu 
that the pervasiveness of the crime required conviction to 
send a message to others, reversal was warranted, State v. 
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Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402. Where the jury observed the 
defendant in handcuffs and the prosecutor commented in closing 
on a prior unrelated arrest, prejudice was found. Owens v. 
State, 654 P.2d 657, 659. 
3. OTHER PROSECUTORAL MISCONDUCT 
In addition to the above, the prosecutor referred to 
the fact that the defendants had not volunteered hair samples 
for analysis (T. 373; objection T. 426); and, to 
Mr. Humphrey's refusal to take part in a line-up (T. 615; 
objection T. 623; and R. 289-90, T. 748). Such comments 
either directly or inferentially on a defendant's failure to 
give evidence are prohibited. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 
554; State v. DeAlo 748 P.2d 195, 198-99 (Utah App. 1987). 
In his closing, the prosecutor mischaracterized the 
facts and the law by referring to Russell Martindale as 
"always being a defense witness" (T. 572,) and that Martindale 
had only been given immunity because "he was subpoenaed by the 
defense and there's no point in having him take the stand and 
claim his fifth amendment privileges" (T. 573). The 
prosecutor referred to other crimes in other jurisdictions as 
being the reason Martindale was "circumspect" in his testimony 
(T. 572). In actuality, no charges had ever been brought 
against Mr. Martindale. While there is wide latitude in a 
closing argument, these deliberate comments and misstatements 
merely add to the cumulative prejudice created by the 
prosecutor. State v. Valdez 513 P.2d 422, 426. 
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This is not a case where the factual events 
surrounding the crime are uncontested. State v. Speer, 750 
P.2d 186. Rather, the facts are very much in dispute. In 
this context/ the repeated and flagrent misconduct of the 
prosecutor prejudiced Mr. Webb's right to a fair trial and 
warrant the reversal of his conviction. State v. Troy, 688 
P.2d 483. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING 
THE ARREST OF MR. WEBB. 
A. The Shotgun, Watch and Ring Were 
Seized Pursuant to an Unlawful Arrest 
and Should Have Been Excluded at 
Trial. 
Utah law requires that when a peace officer makes an 
arrest that he: 
inform the person being arrested of his 
intention, cause and authority to arrest 
him. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-6 (1982). But, no notice is required if: 
there is reason to believe the notice will 
endanger the life or safety of the officer 
or another person or will likely enable the 
party arrested to escape. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-6(1). Similiarily, a peace officer in 
effecting an arrest may "break the door or window of the 
building in which the person to be arrested is," Utah Code 
Ann. §77-7-8 (1982), but only if he has complied with the 
notice provisions of §77-7-6 or falls within the exceptions 
of §77-7-6(1). 
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The purpose behind knock-and-wait statutes 
is to effect a peaceful arrest, for: 
When an officer bursts in with gun drawn 
immediately after knocking, but without 
waiting for a reply, and without announcing 
his purpose.. . there [is] a potential for 
violence to both occupants and police 
arising from the manner of entry. 
State v. Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 738 P.2d 329, 332 
(1987). Equally, of concern, is the protection of the right 
to privacy of the occupants. State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 1006 
(Alaska App. 1986). Thus, where a defendant makes a prima 
facie case of the police failing to comply with the notice 
provisions, the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that 
compliance did in fact occur or that extingent circumstances 
existed at the time of the arrest. United States v. Murrie, 
534 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1976); State v. Johnson, supra; State 
v. Chichester, supra; People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d 
1238 (1971) . Proof of extingent circumstances must be made by 
"pointing to specific, articulable facts and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom which justify the intrusion", State v* 
Chichester, 738 P.2d at 332. Thus, where the police had 
received a specific prior warning from the suspect's wife that 
the suspect would fight if arrested and, upon knocking, the 
officer heard suspicious noises inside indicating that the 
suspect was searching for a weapon, extingent action ws 
warranted. I^d. Failure to comply with a knock-and-announce 
statute creates an illegal entry and any evidence derived from 
the illegality should be suppressed. State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 
1006. 
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Similarily, this Court has held that §77-7-6 notice 
requirements are not merely directive, but mandatory. "To be 
lawful, an arrest must be effected in accordance with 
statutory dictates," McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 
P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1984) . 
In the present case, the police knocked on the Webb's 
door and without further warning or announcement pushed the 
unlocked door open (T. 687, 696). "Opening a closed but 
unlocked door constitutes a 'breaking1 for the purposes of 
knock and announce requirements," State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 
at 1008, citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 
588-90, n.5, 88 S. Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed 2d 828, (1968). 
No specific facts creating an exception to the 
statutory requirement for prior warning were alleged. 
Detective Jackson did testify that the arresting officers 
assumed that the defendant was armed since a weapon was used 
in the robbery (T. 651). However, such an assumption is 
generally true of most felony arrests* Danger can be created, 
under such circumstances, by entering without warning as well 
as by giving warning. No extingent circumstances existed 
justifying the police's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. 
§77-7-6 and § 77-7-8. 
Because the statutes were not complied with, Mr. Webb's 
arrest was unlawful and in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of 
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the Utah Constitution. State v. Chichester, 738 P.2d at 332 
Any evidence seized pursuant to the arrest and illegal entry 
should be excluded. The shotgun, ring and watch (Exhibits 1, 
2 and 3, respectively, R. 166) should not have been admitted 
at trial. Without this evidence, there would have been no 
physical evidence to tie Mr. Webb to the crime. (See Point I 
re. insufficiency of the evidence.) Therefore, admission 
of the illegally seized evidence was prejudical and Mr. Webb1 
conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
B. Even if the Arrest Is Found to Be 
Lawful, the Subsequent Search of the 
Premises Was Not Incident to the 
Arrest nor Was There Valid Consent. 
An appellate court will generally not disturb a 
lower court's factual evaluation underlying its decision to 
deny a motion to suppress unless the trial court's findings 
are clearly erroneous, State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 
(Utah 1987); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
However, to properly assess the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, the appellate 
court can afford no such deference but must apply a 
For purposes of a defendant's right to be lawfully 
arrested, both the federal and state constitutional provision 
are uniform. This right is so universally recognized that no 
separate constitutional analysis is required. The issue here 
is whether there was compliance with a state statute defining 
the procedure for a lawful arrest. 
Mr. Webb was arrested in his home which he shared with 
Ms. Renae Gregersen, originally a co-defendant in this case. 
Also, arrested at the location, was the third co-defendant, 
Mr. Humphrey. The evidence seized was found in a search of 
the premises. The police had arrest warrants but no search 
warrants (T. 300-02) . 
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"correction of error" standard. Qates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 
658, 659 (Utah 1988) . 
As discussed in Point 1(A) of this brief, United 
States Supreme Court decisions interpreting constitutional 
rights merely mark the minimum guaranties of those individuals 
rights. State appellate courts must independently construe 
the full extent of their state constitutional protections. 
Any analysis of the legality of a search and seizure 
must start with the assumption that any search conducted 
"outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a 
judge or magistrate, [is] per se unreasonable" under either 
the state or federal constitution. State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 
478, 482 (Utah 1981) (J. Wilkms concurring opinion), quoting 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed 2d 
576 (1967) . This prohibition is subject to only a few 
specifically defined exceptions; two of which are a limited 
search incident to arrest and a valid consent search. State 
v. Griffin, 626 P.2d at 482 n.2. But it is the state's burden 
to justify a warrantless search by establishing an exception 
to the warrant requirement from the totality of the 
circumstances. State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986); 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 92 S. Ct. 204, 36 L.Ed 
2d 854 (1973) . 
An arrested suspect may consent to a warrantless 
search of his property or premises, State v. Griffin, 629 P.2d 
478, but to be valid such a consent must be "properly obtained 
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and freely given." State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375. The 
consent may not be merely a "peaceful submission by the 
arrested suspect to the authority of a law enforcement 
officer", but must be "an intelligent and intentional waiver 
of a constitutional right." Thurlow v. State, 81 Nev. 510, 406 
P.2d 918, 921 (1965) . 
The test of the voluntariness of the waiver is 
threefold. First, there must be clear and positive evidence 
that the consent was specific and unequiviocal; second, the 
consent must be given without duress or coercion; and, third, 
the factual evidence surrounding the consent must be viewed 
with a presumption disfavoring a waiver by the individual of 
his constitutional rights. State v. Anderson, 754 P.2d 542, 
544 (N. Mex. App. 1988). The presumption against a waiver 
of constitutional rights is particularly strong where the 
alleged consenting person is in custody at the time of 
questioned consent. Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th 
Cir. 1965) . 
Courts have universally held that there can be no 
free and intelligent waiver where the consent was obtained 
through intimidation or duress. State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 
1375; Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827; State v. Kananen, 
97 Ariz. 233, 399 P.2d 426 (En banc 1965). Such coercion is 
necessarily implicit where there are drawn guns, Weed, or 
officers demanding entry upon the mere authority of their 
badges, Kananen. 
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In Mr. Webb's case, some ten arresting officers in 
the early morning hours broke into the home with guns drawn, 
knocking down Ms. Gregersen, who was dressed only in her 
nightgown and robe. (T. 696, 650, 652). Throughout the 
arrest, Ms. Gregersen was distraught over her crying infant 
who was on a heart monitor (T. 659, 668, 688, 696). She was 
worried about her older son, who the officers also had at 
gunpoint (T. 687, 672, 696). Ms. Gregersen was crying and 
upset when approached to give her consent (T. 668) . She 
could not remember signing any form (T. 696-697) . 
The totality of the circumstances establish that 
Ms. Gregersen had been threatened at gunpoint and was being 
held in custody. She believed her children were in danger. 
In the midst of the drama of her arrest, she did not freely 
consent but acquiesced out of fear and confusion. Under these 
circumstances, there is no way to tell what the scope of any 
alleged consent would have been absent the intimidation and 
duress. Acting without a search warrant, the police failed to 
obtain valid consent. 
Despite the lack of a warrant or consent, Utah law 
allows a limited search pursuant to a lawful arrest. State v. 
Griffin, 626 P.2d at 482, n. 2. 
The underlying justifications for a warrantless 
search of an arrestee's person and the area 
within his immediate control are twofold: (1) to 
remove weapons the arrestee may use to resist an arr 
effect an escape, (2) to prevent concealment or 
destruction of evidence linking the arrestee with 
the crime. 
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983). But, the area 
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of search must be limited to that "within the immediate 
control" of the arrestee, for: 
There is no comparable justification, 
however, for routinely searching any room 
other than that in which an arrest occurs 
or, for that matter, for searching through 
all the desk drawers or other closed or 
concealed areas in that room itself. 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 
L.Ed 2d 685 (1969). Thus, once an arrestee is handcuffed and 
removed from a room, a search of that room cannot be justified 
as incident to arrest since the room is no longer under the 
arrestee's immediate control. State v. Minear, 47 Ore. App. 
995, 615 P.2d 416 (1980) . 
Under this doctrine, if the arrest of the Mr. Webb is 
found to be lawful, areas within his immediate control - but 
only such areas - could be validly searched for weapons. 
Here, Mr. Webb was lying on a bed in a bedroom at the time of 
his arrest (T. 328, 665). Simultaneously, Mr. Humphrey and 
Ms. Gregersen were arrested (T. 665). All were handcuffed 
T. 666). Ms. Gregersen was at the kitchen table; Messrs. Webb 
and Humphrey were handcuffed and forced to lie on the kitchen 
floor (T. 667-669). Only after Mr. Webb was removed from the 
bedroom and handcuffed was the bedroom searched and Exhibit 1, 
the shotgun, located under the bed (T. 660, 674-675). The 
shotgun was then placed on the kitchen table, in the very room 
where the handcuffed defendants were being held, and left 
there while a further search of the home was made. (T. 662, 
667-669) . It becomes far-fetched for the State to argue that 
the gun was seized incident to arrest when it was the police 
40 
who seized the gun in an unoccupied room and thereafter left 
it in an area within the control of the defendant. Nor, 
factually, can the seizure of the shotgun be justified as 
consentual where the police admit that the gun was seized 
prior to any consent being given (T. 674-675) . 
Even more tenuous is any claim that the ring taken 
from a jewelry case in the bedroom (Exhibit 2; T. 304) or the 
watch taken from Ms. Gregersen's purse (Exhibit 3; T. 318) 
fall with a valid search incident to arrest. After securing 
all the defendants (T. 660, 667-669), a three-hour search of 
the apartment occurred (T. 318-319) . While a walk-through 
search of a house looking for weapons may validly yield 
evidence of criminal activity in plain sight, State v. Rocha, 
600 P.2d 543, 545-46 (Utah 1979), it cannot be used to justify 
the seizure of items not in plain view. Additionally, once 
the suspects are arrested, the police should look to other 
alternatives to a warrantless arrest, such as securing the 
premises and obtaining a search warrant. State v. Harris, 671 
P.2d at 180. No extingent circumstances can exist where 
"there is no likelihood that evidence still in the room would 
be apt to disappear once the occupants of the [apartment] had 
been removed," State v. Minear, 615 P.2d 416, 417. Here, the 
three adults were taken to jail and an aunt was called to 
remove the children (T. 667). There was no danger of evidence 
being hid or destroyed at the time of the arrest (T. 318); 
and, there was opportunity to secure the premises 
subsequently. A warrant could have been obtained but was not. 
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Since the consent was invalid and no other 
justification for the warrantless search exists, Mr. Webbfs 
rights under the Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution were violated. 
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, having been illegally seized, should have 
been suppressed at trial. Where a reasonable possibility that 
erroneously admitted evidence contributed to defendant's 
conviction, the conviction should be reversed. Thurlow v. 
State, 406 P.2d 918, 922 (See Point II re. insufficiency of 
the evidence.) 
POINT V 
THE INCREASED PENALTY PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-203(1) 
(SUPP. 1988) WERE IMPROPERLY 
APPLIED TO MR. WEBB'S CONVIC1ION 
FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
A. Principles of Statutory Construction 
Require the Application of a Specific 
Statute over a General Provision. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988), otherwise known 
as the enhancement statute, provides that a person convicted 
of a first degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment: 
In the case of a felony of the first 
degree, for a term at not less than five 
years and which may be for life but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm or a 
facsimile or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutJvely and not 
concurrently. 
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Consistently, the enhancement provision has been 
interpreted as not charging a separate and distinct offense 
from the crime charged but as more accurately describing how 
specifically the felony was committed. State v. Angus, 581 
P.2d 992 (Utah 1978). Thus, where a statute generally 
prohibits a crime from being committed with a deadly weapon, 
the defendant's penalty may be increased when that weapon is a 
firearm. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988). The 
enhancement is merely part of the penalty based on the 
specific type of weapon used. Id. 
This approach makes sense where the substantive 
statute only prohibits the use of force in generic terms. 
Examples are aggravated burglary, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 
(Supp. 1988), punishing burglary committed with the use of "a 
dangerous or deadly weapon," State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186; 
aggravated assault, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1978) , 
prohibiting assault by use of a "deadly weapon," State v. 
Angus, 581 P.2d 992; or the homicide statute-, Uwan v-oae Ann. 
§76-5-201 et seq., (Supp. 1988) which do not characterize the 
offense by weapon use, State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1985) . In each of these cases, this Court recognized the 
legislative prerogative to distinguish between degrees of 
dangerous weapons. No clearer example is found than in the 
statutory definitions of "dangerous weapon" being: 
. . . any item that in the manner of its 
use or intended use is capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury...; 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501 (2) (a) (Supp. 1988), and, the 
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definition of "firearms" as, 
. . . pistols, revolvers, sawed-off 
shotguns or sawed-off rifles, or any device 
that could be used as a weapon from which 
is expelled a projectile by any force. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501(2)(b) (Supp. 1988). All firearms 
are dangerous weapons but not all dangerous weapons are 
firearms. 
But a very different statutory scheme exists under 
the aggravated robbery statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 
(1978) by which Defendant Webb was convicted. Prior to 1975, 
aggravated robbery was defined as robbery committed by use of 
a deadly weapon. (See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953)). The 
pre-1975 statute was consistent with the generic language of 
the current aggravated burglary and aggravated assault 
statutes. However, a 1975 amendment to the aggravated robbery 
statute changed this language to its present specific form, 
that is: 
A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he . . . 
uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, 
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly 
weapon . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1) (a). The change in the language is 
critical. Under the burglary or assault statutes, a defendant 
has one punishment if no weapon is used, an increased 
punishment if a deadly weapon is used and the possibility of 
enhancement if that deadly weapon is a firearm. Three stages 
of distinct dangerousness; three levels of punishment. 
However, under the robbery statutes, a defendant has one 
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punishment if no weapon is used, an increased punishment if a 
firearm is used and still, according to the lower court, a 
mandatory enhancement for the use of the same weapon, a 
firearm. Two stages of dangerous; yet, three levels of 
punishment. 
Such a statutory structure was rejected under nearly 
identical facts in Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 55 
L.Ed.2d 70, 98 S. Ct. 909 (1978). Under the federal statutory 
scheme, bank robbery had one punishment while aggravated bank 
robbery, defined as robbery with a firearm, had an increased 
penalty. The issue was whether the federal enhancement 
provision could also be imposed based on the use of the same 
specified weapon, the firearm. In remanding for 
re-sentencing, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
pyramiding of a sentence already increased by the use of a 
firearm under the substantive offense: 
would violate the established rule of 
construction that 'ambiguity concerning the 
ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity.1 (Citations 
omitted.) 
435 U.S. at 14. 
... "This policy of lenity means that a 
Court will not interpret a federal criminal 
statute so as to increase the penalty that 
it places on an individual when such an 
interpretation can be based on no more than 
a guess as to what Congress intended1. 
(Citations omitted.) 
435 U.S. at 15. Additionally, the Court held that as a 
corollary to the rule of lenity, precedence must be given to 
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the more specific statute (robbery by use of a firearm) over 
the more general enhancement provision where both were focused 
on the same concern. 435 U.S. at 15. 
These same principles of statutory construction have been 
recognized and adopted by the Utah courts. 
It is well-established that ambiguities 
in criminal statutes must be resolved 
in favor of lenity, . . . 
State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, at 562, n. 3 (Utah 1987), 
citing Simpson v. United States in regards minimum mandatory 
sentencing schemes. 
Turning to the Utah statutes, it is not sufficient to 
merely dismiss that fact that in 1975, after the Utah 
enhancement statute was enacted, the Utah legislature amended 
the general language in the aggravated robbery statute to 
include specific reference to the use of a firearm. It must 
be assumed that the legislature had a specific purpose to its 
actions, especially where it declined to amend other 
"aggravated" statutes. While it is true that the result is 
replent with ambiguities, such a situation has been recognized 
in other interpretations of the enhancement statute. See for 
example, State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984). 
The language of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1) (a) is 
clear. Where a person commits a robbery with a firearm his 
The Simpson Court also based its decision on double 
jeopardy grounds finding that the substantive statute and the 
enhancement statue were separate offenses. 435 U.S. at 10. 
Such an approach was specifically rejected by this 
Court in State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978) decided 
subsequent to Simpson but without reference to it. 
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punishment will be increased to a first degree felony, five to 
life. No principle of statutory construction allows for the 
further pyramiding of punishment by imposition of the enhanced 
penalty under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(1). Mr. Webb's case 
should be remanded to the lower court for resentencing. 
B. Even if the Enhancement Provisions 
Are Found Applicable, the Total 
Increase Allowable Is Limited to Five 
Years. 
Even if the enhancement provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988) are found to be applicable to Mr. 
Webb's aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court erred in 
imposing a six year term of enhancement. 
The Judgment and Commitment Order (R. 280) reads: 
Pursuant to UCA 76-3-203(1), the Court 
further sentences defendant Charles William 
Webb to serve a mandatory one year for use 
of a firearm and discretionary five years 
for use of a firearm, each to run 
consecutively to the sentence of five years 
to life. 
However, the lower court's only authority was to impose a 
total enhancement of five years. State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 
601, 603 (Utah 1984). This case should be remanded for 
correction of the sentence. 
POINT VI 
MR. WEBB WAS PREJUDICED BY AN 
INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS IN PART 
ARGUMENTATIVE AND AN IMPROPER 
COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE. 
Language in an instruction which is more properly 
part of counsel's argument is inappropriate. It is a misplaced 
comment on the evidence of the case and not a clear statement 
47 
of the law for the jury's benefit. State v. Pecora, 619 P.2d 
173, 175 (Mont. 1980). Instruction No. 16 (R. 245), which was 
objected to in a timely fashion (T. 624-25) , contains such 
argumentative language. The first sentence of the instruction 
reads: 
[Y]ou are instructed that every person, 
acting with the mental state required for 
the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
(R. 245). This is merely a verbatim reading of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-202 (1978) and is not contested. 
However, the second and final sentence reads: 
. . . [a]ssisting a person who is known to 
have just committed a crime to flee from 
the scene of that crime would render one 
criminally liable for that crime to the 
same degree as the actual perpetrator. 
(R. 245). This more properly belongs in a closing argument, 
since it is an application of the law to the facts of the case 
based on a particular theory of the case. It is not merely a 
statement of the law but unduly comments on the evidence and 
gives it greater emphasis than is proper. 
Since Mr. Webb was prejudiced by this instruction, which 
pointed the jury toward the prosecution's theory of Mr. Webb's 
culpability, his conviction should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Appellant respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse Mr. Webb's conviction and 
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remand this case for dismissal or a new trial; or, in the 
alternative, remand for resentencing. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1989 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
United States Constitutional Provision 
Utah Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Statutes and Rules (in Numerical Order) 
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AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIThD STAThS AMEND XII 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed which district shall ha\e 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and causp of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses m his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence 
AMENDMENT VII 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined m any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people. 
The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress and were ratified 
ts follows New Jersey, Nov 20, 1789 Maryland, Dec 19, 1789, North Carolina, 
Dec 22, 1789, South Carolina, Jan 19, 1790, New Hampshire, Jan 25, 1790 Deliwaie 
Jan 28, 1790, Pennsylvania, Mar 10, 1790 New York, March 27, 1790, Ehode Island, 
June 15, 1790, Vermont, Nov 3, 1791, Virginia, Dec 15, 1791 Connecticut, Georgia 
ifld Massachusetts ratified them on April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939 and March 2, 1939, 
respectively. 
AMENDMENT XI 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
lets of any Foreign State 
History Proposed by Congress on Sep- fied by the legislatures of three fourths 
w b e r 5, 1794, declared to have been rati- of all the states on January 8, 179S 
AMENDMENT XII 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote b\ ballot 
for
 President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an 
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ART. I, § 12 CONSTI 
Land Registration Act. 
The Torrens Act was not unconstitu-
tional as conferring judicial powers on 
registrar of titles. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. 
Bramel, 56 U. oS7, 192 P. 375, 11 A. L. R. 
752. 
Limitation of actions. 
This section does not preclude the legis-
lature from prescribing a statute of limi-
tations for time within which to assail 
the regularity or organization of an irri-
gation district. Horn \ . ShaflVi, 47 U. .">.">, 
151 P. 555. 
Occupational disease law. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in 
excluding compensation for partial disa-
bility from silicosis, and in rendering 
remedy under that act exclusive so as to 
abrogate common-law right of action 
therefor, is not unconstitutional as depiiv-
ing such employee of his remedy by due 
course of law for injury done to his per-
son. Masich v. United States Smelting, 
Ref. & Min. Co., 113 U. 101, 191 P. 2d 612. 
Waiver of rights. 
Right to apply to courts for redress of 
wrong is substantial right, and will not 
be waived by contract except through 
unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle, 
08 U. 486, 251 P. 16. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Employers are entitled to have recourse 
to courts under Workmen's Compensation 
OF UTAH 
Act concerning question of their ultimate 
liability. Industrial Comm. v. Evans, 52 
U. 394^ 174 P. 825. 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not in-
valid because it delegates to industrial 
commission the power to hear, consider 
and determine controversies between liti-
gants as to ultimate liability, or their 
property rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm., 57 U. 246, 194 P. 322. 
Dependents of employee killed by acts 
of third party, a stranger to employment, 
are not limited to recovery under Work-
men's Compensation Act exclushely, un-
less they have assigned their rights to 
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. 
R. Co., 70 U. 441, 261 P. 9. 
Collateral References. 
Constitutional LawC=>322, 324, 327, 328. 
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 709, 711, 
714, 719. 
16 Am. Jur. 2d 718-721, Constitutional 
Law §§ 382-385. 
Law Reviews. 
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 
Edward L. Barrett , Jr., 35 Calif. L. Rev. 
380. 
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
in Anglo-American Law, Paxton Blair, 29 
Colum. L. Rev. 1. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
L. Rev. 248. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Comparable Provision. —acquittal notwithstanding defect in in-
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 16. formation or indictment, 77-24-12. 
—acquittal or dismissal without judg-
Cross-References. ment, 77-24-11. 
Defendant as witness, 77-44-5. — a c * s punishable in different ways, 
Double jeopardy, statutory provision, punishment limited to one, 76-1-23. 
77-1-10. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. I, § 14 
Sec 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of t ie people to bo secuie m their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable sc arches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly desciibing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const , Art I I I , § 7 
Cioss References. 
Controlled Substances Act, search war-
n u t s , 58 37-10. 
Liquor, search, seizure and confiscation, 
62 5 16 et seq. 
Statutory provisions generally, 77 54 1 
et seq. 
In general. 
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum 
nor under a motion to examine will an 
examination be permitted of a nature to 
contiavene provision against unreasonable 
searches and seizures Evans v. Evans, 98 
I 189, 98 P. 2d 703 
It is generally recognized that the legiti 
mate use of a search warrant is restricted 
to public prosecutions, and in no event 
ma} such proceeding be invoked for the 
piotection ot a m u e private right. Allen 
v Trueman, Judge, 100 U. 36, 110 P 2d 
355 
It is use to which it is put that renders 
property, otherwise lawful and rightful 
to hive, use and possess, subject to seizure 
and forfeiture Hemenwav 6c Moser Co. 
v Funk, 100 U. 72, 106 P 2d 779. 
For general discussion of Fourth Amend 
ment to federal Constitution, see Citv of 
Pnce v Javnes, 113 U 89, 191 P 2d 606. 
Where police officers have obtained evi-
dence by illegal methods, such as an un 
liwtul search in violation of this section, 
it should not be used to convict a person 
of crime State v. Louden, 15 U. (2d) 64, 
387 P 2d 240 
R a lvmg on tip, officers obtained per 
mission from proprietor of motel to enter 
deftndant's room where they found a pis-
toi in a drawer which they identified as 
hav mg been stolen in a burglary of a 
shopping center. After replacing the pistol 
in the drawer they waited outside for the 
return of the occupants of the motel room. 
The officers, on obtaining defendant's per 
mission to search the room, m addition to 
the pistol, found wrist watches and crow 
bars which also came from the shopping 
center On the trial of defendant for sec-
ond degree burglary, trial court propeil} 
admitted evidence obtained during such 
sea (h as the search was not unreasonable 
^tate v Louden, lr> U (2d) 64, 387 P 2d 
-40 
Whether a search and seizure is reason 
able is to be determined bv the trial court, 
and evidence m plain view of the officei 
pursuing a felon mav be rightfullv seized 
and such seizure is not a violation of the 
federal constitutional protection as set 
forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U S b43, 6 
L Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct 1684 State v. 
Allred, 16 U. (2d) 41, 395 P. 2d 535 
Automobile search. 
Evidence taken from automobile de 
fendant was driving and subsequentlv 
used to convict him of burglarv and 
grand larceny did not violate constitu 
tional proscription against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, even though taking 
was not connected with cause of arrest 
and was done without search wairant in 
view of facts that car was lawfullv taken 
into possession and impounded when de 
fendant was arrested for driving auto-
mobile which did not belong to him and 
without valid driver's license and since, 
under such circumstances, it was responsi 
bihty of police impounding car to take 
inventory of its contents State v Criscola, 
21 U. (2d) 272, 444 P. 2d 517. 
City ordinance. 
City ordinance allegedly enacted pursu-
ant to powers granted bv 10 8 50, prowd 
mg that right of people of citv "to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable seirches and 
seizures shall not be violated," and making 
violation thereof misdemeanor, was void 
for vagueness and uncertainty in failing 
to define or presence standards to deter 
mine what acts constitute unieisonable 
searches or seizures Citv of Pnce v 
Jaynes, 113 U. 89, 191 P. 2d 000 
Drags. 
Marijuana taken during the search of 
detendant's home pursuant to warrant was 
unlawfully taken and evidence should 
have been suppressed on defendant's mo 
tion because search warrant w is based 
on police officer's oral deposition r i ther 
than on oath or affirmation State v Jasso, 
21 U (2d) 24, 439 P 2d 844 
Liquor. 
Where police officers w*r< in\ estigating 
rooming house under citv oidiname to 
determine if liquor wa^ being sold there, 
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PUNISHMENTS 76-3-203 
violation. Any time spent by a person outside of confinement after commission 
of a parole violation shall not constitute service of the total sentence unless 
the person shall be exonerated at a hearing to revoke the parole. Any time 
spent in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of 
parole shall constitute service of the sentence and, in the case of exoneration 
at such hearing or upon a decision rendered, the time spent shall be included 
in computing the total parole term. 
(4) Whenever any parolee, without authority from the board of pardons, 
shall absent himself from the state or avoid or evade parole supervision, the 
period of absence, avoidance, or evasion shall toll the parole period. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall preclude the board of pardons from parol-
ing or discharging an inmate at any time within the discretion of the board of 
pardons unless otherwise specifically provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-202, enacted by L. der that credit be given for the period of time 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-202; L. 1983, ch. 88, § 4. he spent in pretrial detention was outside the 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment limits prescribed and therefore beyond the 
inserted Mor in the case on parole without court's power, since the power to reduce or ter-
violation" m the first sentence of subsec (1),
 m i n a t e sentences is exclusive with the Board of 
inserted "or m the case on parole without
 P a r d o n s S t a t e v Schreuder, 712 P 2d 264 
violation" in subsec (2)(a), inserted "or ten- (Utah 1985) 
year, as the case mav be" in the first sentence r»^ j
 r J ± 4 . 1 . 1 . 1 ^ . U J 
J
r ' / 0 , j J J j « 1 xu Board of pardons, not the trial court, had au-
of subsec. (3), and added unless otherwise spe- X L ^ X ^ J ^ J . J
 A r li. A 
cifically provided by law" to subsec. (5). * h o n t y *? ^ a n t defendant credit for the tune 
he served prior to conviction State v Alvillar, 
Authority of trial court.
 7 4 8 p 2 d 2 0 7 ( U t a h C t A p p 1 9 8 g ) 
Defendants request that the trial court or-
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
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76-3-205 CRIMINAL CODE 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a 
felony m which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of 
the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any 
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not 
less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not con-
currently. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-203; L. 1976, ch. 9, § 1; 
1977, ch. 88, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 5. 
ANALYSIS 
Increased penalty for use of firearm 
Notice 
Cited 
Increased penalty for use of firearm. 
Information need not state that the en-
hanc ed penalty for use of a firearm will be ap-
plied upon conviction, it is sufficient if it al-
leges either the defendant is being charged un-
der this section or that a firearm was used in 
the commission of the offense State v Angus, 
581 P2d 992 (Utah 1978) 
It is not required that a specific and separate 
finding of use of a firearm must be made in 
order to impose the enhanced penalty for use of 
a firearm in the commission of a felony State 
v Angus, 581 P 2d 992 (Utah 1978) 
The increased penalty for use of a firearm in 
the commission of a felony does not impose 
double punishment for the same criminal act 
nor does it create a separate offense that must 
be pled as a separate charge State v Angus, 
581 P 2d 992 (Utah 1978) 
Title total maximum enhancement sentence 
that a court may impose for use of firearms in 
Cited m State v Neeley, 73 Utah Adv Rep 
53 (1988) 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment 
inserted "unless otherwise specifically pro-
vided by law' in subsec (1) 
first and second degree felonies is five years, 
therefore, trial court did not have authority to 
impose two consecutive enhancement sen-
tences, one for one year and another for five 
years, for a total of six years, upon defendant's 
guilty plea to second degree murder involving 
use of a firearm State v Willett, 694 P 2d 601 
(Utah 1984) 
Notice. 
The enhancement statute is merely part of 
the penalty, and adequate notice is given if the 
information alleges either that the enhance-
ment statute may apply or that a firearm was 
used m the commission of the offense State v 
Speer, 74 Utah Adv Rep 16 (1988) 
Cited in State v Schreuder, 712 P 2d 264 
(Utah 1985), State v Rodriguez, 718 P 2d 395 
(Utah 1986) 
Law Reviews. — Potter v Murray City 
Another Interpretation of Polygamy and the 
First Amendment, 1986 Utah L Rev 345 
76-3-205, Infraction conviction — Fine, forfeiture, and dis-
qualification. 
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Evidence. 
In prosecution for robbery, based on de-
fendant's alleged act of taking money 
from person and presence of another, 
where defense was that, if defendant 
actually was guilty of such act, he took 
money under claim of ownership and in 
honest belief that he had right to it, 
defendant had the right to testify as to 
his intent, belief, and motive at time of 
alleged robbery; it was error for trial 
court to refuse to permit him to answer 
question, asked while he was testifying 
in his own behalf, as to whether at time 
when he allegedly took the money, he 
honestly believed money was his and that 
he had a right to take it. People v. 
Hughes, 11 U. 100, 39 P. 492. 
Possession of stolen property alone 
was not sufficient to sustain conviction 
for robbery, but its quality as evidence 
was of such high degree that only slight 
corroborative proof of other inculpatory 
circumstances would warrant conviction 
of felony murder based on intent to rob. 
State v. Boyland, 27 U. (2d) 268, 495 P. 
2d 315. 
Indictment or information. 
Indictment which charged felonious 
taking by defendant by means of force, 
violence and fear from the immediate 
presence of a party against his will was 
sufficient, though statutory language was 
"person" rather than "presence." People 
v. Kerm, 8 U. 268, 30 P. 988. 
Indictment for robbery, which failed 
to charge that property taken from per-
son of prosecutor was taken "by means 
of force or fear" was insufficient, since 
those words constituted necessary ele-
ment found in definition of robbery. State 
v. Davis, 28 U. 10, 76 P. 705. 
Information for robbery which used 
word "robbed" sufficiently informed ac-
cused of nature and cause of accusation, at 
least in absence of demand for bill of par-
ticulars; there was but one crime of rob-
bery and words such as "by means of 
force or fear" were unnecessary, as indi-
cated in short form prescribed by 77-21-47. 
State v. Bobbins, 102 U. 119, 127 P. 2d 
1042. 
Instructions. 
Fact that instruction defined robbery 
in language of statute did not render 
such proper definition improper because 
instruction did not also define included 
offenses of grand and petit larceny, where 
court at defendant's request gave in-
struction that precluded consideration of 
included offenses and no request was made 
for instructions defining them. State v. 
Sullivan, 73 U. 582, 276 P. 166. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person commits aggravated 
robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed to be uin the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, dur-
ing the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by 
L. 1973, eh. 196, §76-6-302; L. 1975, ch. 
51, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment substituted the 
present language of subd. ( l ) ( a ) for 
"Uses a deadly weapon; or." 
"Facsimile of a firearm." 
Instruction defining "facsimile of a fire-
arm'' as "any instrument that by its ap-
pearance resembles a firearm'' was proper. 
State v. Turner, 572 P. 2d 387. 
Unloaded firearm. 
Aggravated robbery may be committed 
with an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 
572 P. 2J 387. 
CoUateral References. 
Robberv<3=3ll. 
77 C.J.S. Robbery § 28. 
67 Am. Jur. 2d 31, Robbery §4. 
Law Reviews. 
Utah Legislative Survey—1975, 1975 
Utah L. Rev. 834. 
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76-10-309. Infernal machine—Venue of prosecution for shipping —Any 
person knowingly delivering any infernal machine to any railwa\, express, 
or stage company, or to any person or company whatever, for transmission 
to any person m another county may be prosecuted in the count} m which 
he delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-309, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch 196, § 76-10-309. E^plosivesC^o 
35 C J S Explosives § 12 
31 Am Jur. 2d 892, Explosions and Ex 
plosives § 123. 
Part 4 
Fences 
76-10-401. Fencing of shafts and wells —Any person who has sunk or 
shall sink a shaft or well on the public domain for any purpose shall inclose 
it with a substantial curb or fence, which shall be at least four and one-
half feet high. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor. 
History C. 1953, 76-10-401, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-401. NeghgenceC=>144. 
Cross-References. %\2J£A'&Xgn2J™. 
Miscellaneous offenses respecting mines, 
40 5 1 et seq 
57 Am Jur 2d 625, Negligence § 242. 
Part5 
Weapons 
76-10-501. Definitions.—For the purpose of this part 
(1) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that m the manner of its 
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury In 
construing whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a 
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, 
object, or thing; the character of the wound produced, if any, and the 
manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used shall be deter-
minative. 
(2) "Firearms" means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, or sawed 
off rifles, and/or any device that could be used as a weapon from which is 
expelled a projectile by any force 
(3) "Sawed-off shotgun" means a shotgun having a barrel or barrels 
of Less than eighteen inches in length, or m the case of a rifle, ha\ ing a 
barrel or barrels of less than sixteen inches m length, or any weapon made 
from a rifle or shotgun (whether b} alteration, modification or otherwise) 
if the weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches 
(4) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is unlawful to dis-
charge a weapon. 
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(5) "Crime of violence" means murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, 
nia? hem kidnaping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or black-
mail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, 
assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for 
nore than one year, arson punishable b\ imprisonment for more tl an one 
\ear, or an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences 
(6) "Bureau means the Utah state bureau of criminal identification 
History C. 1953, 76-10-501, enacted W tvpe handgun is a dangerous weapon" 
L 1973, eh, 196, §76-10 501, L. 1974, ch under law, but that "gun clip alone vuth 
32, §27 or without cartridges is not a dangerous 
weapon" were not error because consonant 
Compiler's Notes.
 W1th statute and not prejudicial to detend 
The 1974 amendment substituted "pro ant, State v Nielsen, 544 P 2d 489 
-jectile" for "projective" in subsec (2) 
Collateral References. 
Substitution of "gun" for "dangerous 
weapon ' in jury instructions \VeaponsC=»8 
Jury instructions which stated that to 94 C J S Weapons § 1 
convict defendant he must have "had a 79 Am Jur 2d 3, Weapons and Fire-
gun in his possession" and that "a pistol arms § 1 
76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded—For the purpose of this 
section, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or other weapon described 
in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when there is an unexpended 
cartridge, shell or projectile in the firing position, except m the case 
of pistols and revolvers, in which case they shall be deemed loaded when 
the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is m a position that the 
manual operation of anv mechanism once would cause the unexpended 
cartridge, shell, or projectile to be fired, and a muzzle loading firearm 
shall be deemed to be loaded when it is capped or primed and has a 
powder charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders 
History C 1953, 79-100-502, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-10-502, L. 1974, ch. 79 Am Jur 2d 7, Weapons and Fire 
32, § 28. arms § 3. 
Compiler's Notes 
The 1974 amendment substituted "pro 
jectile" for "projective" in two instances 
76-10-503 Possession of dangerous weapon—Persons not permitted to 
have—(1) An} person who is not a citizen of the United States, or anv 
person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under the laws of 
the United States, the state of Utah or any other state government, or 
country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drusr or ?ny person 
who has been declared mentally incompetent shall not own or have in his 
possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as de 
fined in this part Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun he shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree 
(2) Any person who is on parole for a felony or is incarcerated at 
the Utah state prison shall not have in his possession or under his custody 
or control any dangerous weapon as defined m th s part Any person who 
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CHAPTER 32 
COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS 
Section Section 
77-32 1 Minimum standards pro\ided by 77 32 5 Expenses of printing bnel& depo&i 
county for defense of indigent de tions and transcripts 
fendants 
77-32-2 Assignment of counsel on request of 
defendant or order of court 
77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for de-
fense of indigent defendants. 
The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, cit\ 
and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts 
and various administrative bodies of the state 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of his liberty, 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel, 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a com-
plete defense, 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client, and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of 
other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending 
counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-1, enacted by L. Nordgren v Mitchell Indigent Paternity De-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 67, § 1; 1983, ch. fendants Right to Counsel 1982 Utah L Rev 
52, § 1. 933 
Compiler's Notes - The.1983 amendment
 J u d l c i a l j a b berwocky or Uniform Constitu 
substituted substania l probability for pos
 { p ^ ^ , Strickland v Washington 
sibihty in subsec (1), and deleted or other , _T A . _ . , . _ „ ^ A& 
serious criminal sanction" at the end of subsec a n d National Standards for Ineffective Assis 
Q ) tance of Counsel Claims, 1985 Utah L Rev 
Law Reviews. — Utah Legislative Survey 723 
— 1981, 1982 Utah L Rev 125 202 
77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of defendant or 
order of court. 
Counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent person who is under 
arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial probability 
that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if 
(1) The defendant requests it, or 
(2) The court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defen-
dant does not affirmatively waive or reject of record the opportunity to be 
represented 
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with the client and with those who might be from proving the services rendered in an action 
injured by the client, the lawyer's own involve- to collect it 
ment m the transaction and factors that may 
extenuate the conduct in question In any case, Disclosures Otherwise Required or 
a disclosure adverse to the client's interest Authorized 
should be no greater than the lawyer believes
 T h e a t t o r n e v . c h e n t l e l s d e f i n ^ 
necessary to the purpose A lawyer s decision
 ferentlv m v a n ( m s u n s d l c t i o n a ff a u " « 
not to take preventive action Permitted by
 c a , l e d a g a W l t n e g s teStlmony conW 
paragraph (b (1) does not violate this Rule
 a d a b g e n t ^ b ^ J ^ 
The term another m paragraph (b)(1) m-
 l 6 ( a ) r e g t h e u to m v o k e ^ « * 
eludes a person organization and government ^
 w h e n l t a a p h c a b l e 
Paragraph (b)(2) does not apply where a law-
 T h e R u l e g o { ^ { ^ ^ ^ C o n d u c t l n v 
yer is employed after a crime of fraud has been
 c l r c u m s t a n c e s p e ^ 0r require a lawyer^ 
committed to represent the client in matters
 d l s c l o s e l n f o r m a t I o n r e l a t l n g to t h e r e p r 4 l J 
ensuing therefrom
 t l o n g ^ R u l e s i 13, 2 2, 2 3, 3 3 and 4 1 la 
_ ^ -,
 r , .-, , , addition to these provisions, a lawyer mav ht 
Dispute Concerning Lawyers Conduct
 o b l l g a t e d o r p i t t e d by other provision! rf 
If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing m ^ * ^ i n f o r m a t i o n about a cuaot 
which the client's conduct is implicated, the ^ e t i ? * r another provision of law supem* 
rule of confidentiality should not prevent the * u l e l 6 l s * £ * ' °f i n t f r P r e t a t l o n ***** 
lawyer from defending himself Such a charge ^ e ^ o p e °f t h e s e fule% b u t a P r e 8 ^P*» 
can arise in a civil, criminal or professional s h o u i d e x i s t a g a l n s t s u c h a ^ P ^ s s i o n . 
disciplinary proceeding and can be based on a jjse 0f information 
wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer 
against the client or on a wrong alleged by a A lawyer may not make use of lnfonnatwt 
third person, for example, a person claiming to relating to the representation m a manner do-
have been defrauded by the lawyer and client advantageous to the client The duty of coofr 
acting together A lawyer entitled to a fee is dentiahty continues after the client-lawyer i* 
not prevented by the rule of confidentiality lationship has terminated See Rule 1.9. 
Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule. 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
will be directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the respesentation will not 
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or 
to a third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not bt 
adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. When representation « 
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shifl 
include explanation to each client of the implications of the common rep* 
resentation and the advantages and risks involved. ^ 
(c) A lawyer shall not simultaneously represent the interests of advefl* 
parties in separate matters, unless: * 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation of each will** 
be adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
COMMENT 
Loyalty to a Client tion is undertaken, in which event the 
sentation should be declined If such a t~»£. 
Loyalty is an essential element in the law- arises after representation has been ^ ^ 
yer's relationship to a client An impermissible taken, the lawyer should withdraw fr0-*^ 
conflict of interest may exist before represents- representation See Rule 114 Wher* 
